

Online Appendix: Additional Tables

TABLE B1  
The determinants of the degree of equality (Ordered Probit, marginal effects)

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	$\partial \Pr(\text{equality} = \text{low})$ $\partial X$	$\partial \Pr(\text{equality} = \text{medium} / \text{low})$ $\partial X$	$\partial \Pr(\text{equality} = \text{medium} / \text{high})$ $\partial X$	$\partial \Pr(\text{equality} = \text{equal} - \text{sharing})$ $\partial X$
<b>Wealth:</b>				
Wealth score	-0.183*** (0.044)	0.034** (0.014)	0.037*** (0.014)	0.113*** (0.029)
<b>ideology:</b>				
ideology score	-0.126** (0.052)	0.023* (0.012)	0.025* (0.013)	0.077** (0.032)
<b>Controls:</b>				
Group size	-0.0001 (0.0004)	0.0000 (0.0001)	0.0000 (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0002)
Year established	0.007 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.004 (0.003)
Average household size	0.403 (0.252)	-0.075 (0.054)	-0.080 (0.056)	-0.248 (0.156)
Land per member	-0.008** (0.004)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.005* (0.002)
Members' average age	0.020 (0.015)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.013 (0.009)
Pr(equality=low)	0.541			
Pr(equality=medium/low)		0.202		
Pr(equality=med/medium/high)			0.097	
Pr(equality=equal-sharing)				0.160
Observations	142	142	142	142

Notes: the dependent variable is the degree of equality. t-test significant at \*\*\*1% \*\*5% \*10%. Standard errors in parentheses.

TABLE B2: Robustness to OLS instead of Probit  
**The higher the wealth, the higher the degree of equality**

Estimation Method	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Dependent Variable	Degree of equality	Degree of equality	Degree of equality	Degree of equality	Degree of equality	Degree of equality	Degree of equality	Degree of equality	Degree of equality	Degree of equality	Degree of equality
<b>Wealth:</b>											
Credit rating (1-4)	0.406*** (0.102)										
Economic strength (1-4)		0.374*** (0.095)									
Credit rating (1-100)			0.017*** (0.005)								
Fixed capital per member				4.228*** (1.454)							
Assets per member					2.049*** (0.591)						
Wealth score						0.460*** (0.096)	0.496*** (0.090)	0.429*** (0.096)	0.472*** (0.098)	0.432*** (0.098)	0.428*** (0.098)
<b>Ideology:</b>											
Most socialist movement (Artzi)								0.401** (0.194)			
% votes to socialist parties									0.007 (0.012)		
<b>Ideological decline:</b>											
Decline in % votes to socialist parties										-0.031** (0.014)	
<b>Ideology score</b>											
											0.253** (0.114)
<b>Controls:</b>											
Group size	0.002** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)		0.001 (0.001)	0.0008 (0.0008)	0.0004 (0.0008)	0.0005 (0.0008)
Year established	-0.013 (0.011)	-0.014 (0.011)	-0.020* (0.011)	-0.020* (0.012)	-0.024** (0.012)	-0.012 (0.012)		-0.014 (0.012)	-0.013 (0.012)	-0.016 (0.012)	-0.015 (0.012)
Average household size	-0.574 (0.503)	-0.577 (0.503)	-0.674 (0.499)	-0.601 (0.567)	-0.692 (0.569)	-0.961* (0.569)		-0.851 (0.565)	-0.862 (0.573)	-0.905 (0.561)	-0.787 (0.563)
Land per member	0.019** (0.008)	0.017** (0.008)	0.017** (0.008)	0.020** (0.009)	0.020** (0.009)	0.017* (0.009)		0.017* (0.009)	0.017* (0.009)	0.017* (0.009)	0.016* (0.009)
Members' average age	-0.085*** (0.029)	-0.081*** (0.030)	-0.090*** (0.029)	-0.068** (0.034)	-0.076** (0.033)	-0.061* (0.034)		-0.069** (0.034)	-0.051 (0.034)	-0.052 (0.034)	-0.054 (0.034)
Observations	188	188	184	159	156	147	151	147	142	142	142

Notes: The dependent variable is the kibbutz's degree of equality (the higher, the more equal). t-test significant at \*\*\*1% \*\*5% \*10%. Standard errors in parentheses.

TABLE B3: Exit regression run separately for kibbutzim of Artzi and Takam movements

**The higher the wealth, the lower the exit rates**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Subsample	Takam	Takam	Takam	Takam	Artzi	Artzi	Artzi	Artzi
Estimation Method	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
Dependent Variable	Exit rate	Exit rate	Exit rate	Exit rate	Exit rate	Exit rate	Exit rate	Exit rate
<b>Wealth:</b>								
Credit rating (1-4)	-1.097*** (0.274)		-1.009*** (0.276)		-0.363*** (0.135)		-0.368*** (0.134)	
Economic strength (1-4)		-0.745*** (0.265)		-0.664** (0.264)		-0.297** (0.123)		-0.298** (0.122)
<b>Ideology:</b>								
% votes for socialist parties	-0.027 (0.030)	-0.028 (0.031)			-0.010 (0.008)	-0.010 (0.008)		
<b>Ideological decline:</b>								
Decline in % votes for socialist parties			0.074** (0.034)	0.084** (0.035)			0.022 (0.014)	0.022 (0.015)
<b>Controls:</b>								
Artzi Movement								
Group size	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.003* (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.0007 (0.0018)	-0.0008 (0.0018)
Year established	-0.017 (0.024)	-0.006 (0.025)	-0.013 (0.024)	-0.002 (0.024)	-0.040** (0.018)	-0.044** (0.018)	-0.039** (0.018)	-0.043** (0.018)
Average household size	-0.164 (1.403)	-0.382 (1.451)	-0.411 (1.385)	-0.647 (1.425)	-0.076 (0.580)	-0.110 (0.586)	0.097 (0.574)	0.073 (0.582)
Land per member	0.020 (0.021)	0.026 (0.021)	0.018 (0.020)	0.024 (0.021)	0.032*** (0.011)	0.034*** (0.011)	0.034*** (0.010)	0.036*** (0.011)
Members' average age	-0.219*** (0.082)	-0.208** (0.086)	-0.253*** (0.082)	-0.246*** (0.085)	-0.014 (0.035)	-0.023 (0.036)	-0.011 (0.034)	-0.019 (0.035)
Observations	113	113	112	112	65	65	65	65
R-squared	0.33	0.28	0.36	0.32	0.31	0.29	0.32	0.30

Notes : The dependent variable is exit rate (in %). t-test significant at \*\*\*1% \*\*5% \*10%. Standard errors in parentheses.